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The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an
inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-
sharing in a fiscal union, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates
the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline. In a monetary union, however, this adverse effect on
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The process of European monetary unification faces four tnajor institutional issues. The first is that
the European Central Bank (ECB) needs to build up credibility for i[s committnent to price stability.
This requires it to adopt an appropriate targeting procedure. Although no formal decisions have
been taken in this respect, most likely either money supply or inflation will be targeted (see Persson
and Tabellini, 1996, and Svensson, 1997).
The second major issue regarding the process of European monetary unification is that
national monetary policies can no longer be used to stabilise country-specific shocks. This is
especially serious because empirical work reveals that cross-border ownership of private assets
plays only a minor role in dealing with country-specific shocks in Europe (see e.g. Sorensen and
Yosha, 1998). The lack of monetary instruments to stabilise country-specific shocks together with
inadequate cross-country risk sharing through capital markets lends support to the well-known
argument that monetary unification requires fiscal unification: risk sharing through a fiscal transfer
scheme (F'fS) should take over the task of national monetary policies in stabilising country-specific
shocks.
The third tnajor issue facing European monetary unification is that such an FfS may give
rise to moral hazard because country-specific shocks are not perfectly observable. International
transfers thus cannot be conditioned on these exogenous shocks, but have to be based on fiscal
measures that may be affected also by (endogenous) fiscal discipline. By providing additional
transfers from the other participants in the scheme, an F'I'S rewards governments for less fiscal
discipline. This induces govertunents to exert insufficient discipline as some of the costs of lack of
discipline can be shifted to the other members ofthe union.
This relates to the fourth tnajor issue surrounding European monetary unification, namely
lack of fiscal discipline. The lack of fiscal discipline produced by interna[ional risk-sharing is
particularly costly in terms of social welfaze because also domestic political distortions are likely to
erode fiscal discipline. Accordingly, moral hazard due to intemational risk-shazing worsens
domestic political distortions.
This paper investigates the case for monetary and fiscal unification by exploring the
interaction between these four issues involving, respectively, lack of commitment in monetary
policy, stabilisation of country-specific shocks, moral hazard due to international risk-sharing, and
domestic poliàcal distortions producing a lack of fiscal discipline.
As far as the case for fiscal unification is concemed, international risk-sharing through an
FTS gives rise to moral hazard. Hence, a trade-off emerges between fiscal discipline and risk-
sharing. To protect fiscal discipline, an F'I'S that provides full insurance against idiosyncratic2
shocks is no longer optimal. In fact, any international risk sharing may be undesirable if labour
market distortions and public spending requirements are large relative to the variance of the
country-specific shocks. With large spending requirements and serious labour-market distortions,
fiscal discipline is particularly beneficial in terms of alleviating tax distortions and the inflation bias
due to lack of commitment. At the same time, with small country-specific shocks, intemational risk-
sharing is only of minor impottance. Hence, in trading off substantial gains from more fiscal
discipline with only small gains from risk-sharing, the union optimally refrains from using an FTS.
Domestic political distortions further strengthen the case against an FTS; lower fiscal discipline
hurts social welfare by exacerbating not only the distortions due to lack of commitment (i.e. the
inflation bias) but also domestic political distortions.
The case for monetary unifica6on at first sight appears to become weaker if moral hazard
prevents intemadonal risk-sharing (i.e. fiscal unification). In a fiscal union with full international
risk sharing, national monetary policy is not needed to stabilise country-specific shocks because the
FI'S would pool these shocks. In the absence of full risk-sharing, however, giving up national
monetary authority is costly in terms of less effective stabilisation of country-specific shocks.
This paper defies this cotnnton wisdom about the link between monetary and fiscal
unification. It shows that monetary unification may be desirable even if moral hazard makes fiscal
unification (i.e. full international risk-sharing) unattractive so that monetary unification is costly in
terms of providing less effective stabilisation of country-specific shocks. In fact, even if moral
óazard is so serious that no international risk sharing is optimal, a monetary union may be
preferable to decentralised monetary policy.
The key to understanding the benefits from monetary unification is that institutional
measures aimed at promoting the credibiliry of monetary policy, namely inflation targets for a
central bank, weaken fiscal discipline but less so in a monetary union. In particular, imposing a
tighter inflation target on the central bank implies that the inflation preferences of govemments and
the central bank diverge more. This induces govemments to cut back on fiscal discipline so as to
encourage the central bank to raise inflatlon to a level that is more in line with the governments'
preferred rate. However, the effect of a unilateral reduction in fiscal discipline on the inflation rate
is weaker in a monetary union than with nadonal monetary policy because fiscal policy of each
individual country exerts only a relatively small effect on union-wide monetary policy. The
incentive to reduce fiscal discipline so as to undo the effects of the inflation target by forcing the3
central bank to produce higher inflation is thus weaker in a monetary union.' Accordingly, the
trade-off between enhancing the credibiliry of monetary policy (by imposing an inflation target) and
encouraging fiscal discipline is less sharp in a monetary union. On balance, a mone[ary union yields
lower inflation, higher output and more fiscal discipline.
The lack of fiscal discipline due to domestic political distortions and international risk-
sharing together with the inflation bias due to lack of commitment gives rise to a trade-off when
considering the case for monetary unification. This trade-off is between, on the one hand,
strengthening commitment and encouraging fiscal discipline and, on the other hand, giving up an
instrument for facilitating the stabilisation of country-specific shocks. Monetary unification is
optimal íf the problems of lack ofcommitment and fiscal discipline dominate the need for stabilising
country-specific shocks. Numerical results show that ihis is the case for a wide range of parameter
values. In fact, for any of the parameter combina[ions we have investigated, monetary union
outperforms national monetary policymaking. Monetary unification becomes relatively more
desirable if country-specific shocks are small, if serious domestic political distortions weaken fiscal
discipline, and if large government spending requirements and output distortions raise the
temptation of the central bank to employ a surprise inflation as a way to alleviate distortions in the
output market.
The conditions that make a monetary union relatively more desirable contribute to a fiscal
union being undesirable. In particular, for a monetary union without a fiscal union to be optimal,
lack of both commitment in monetaty policy and discipline in fiscal policy need to be serious while
country-specific stabilisation should only be of minor importance due to small country-specific
shocks. Commitment problems are important if monetary authorities are tempted to boost output in
view of both large non-tax distortions and large spending requirements producing serious tax
distortions. These output distortions exacerbate also the problem oflack offiscal discipline.
To explore the interaction between the credibility of monetary policy, fiscal discipline,
international risk-sharing, and country-specific shock stabilisation, we extend ihe Barro and Gordon
(1983a,b) model of discretionary monetary policymaking by including fiscal policy, unobservable
' A similar mechanism is explored in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). In particular, in setting the tax rate, the
fiscal authority acts as a Stackelberg leader against the central bank. Ifthe central bank prefers lower intlation
than the fiscal authority does (e.g., because it is more conservative in the sense ofRogoff(1985) or because of
the presence ofan inflation target), the fiscal authority facesan incentive to raise taxes so
as to induce the central bank to raise inflation. Since the effect of a unilateral change in taxes on the common
inflation rate is weaker in a monetary union than with national monetary policymaking, the incentive to raise
taxes in orderto force the common central bank to produce higher inflation is weaker.4
exogenous shocks, fiscal discipline, domestic political distortions, multiple countries, and
international risk-sharing. In this way, we can study the interaction between three distortions,
namely lack of commitment in monetary policy,2 moral hazard due to intemational risk-sharing in
the presence of asymmetric information about fiscal discipline, and domestic political distortions
producing a lack of fiscal discipline. Domestic political distortions are present if the costs of
exerting fiscal discipline are larger for the govemment than for sociery at large. This is the case if
the costs of fiscal discipline fall mainly on the government's own constituency while the benefits
accrue to sociery at large. Indeed, fiscal discipline may be especially costly to the governtnent
because it harms its own constituency and, therefore, erodes its political support.
Monetary and fiscal poticy are modelled as follows. While monetary policy may be set at
the central, union level by a common central bank (CCB), taxes are selected at a decentralised level
by the national governments of the member countries of the union. Before taxes and monetary
policy are selected, the national govemments determine fiscal discipline. In choosing discipline, the
governments thus act as Stackelberg leaders against the CCB. Fiscal discipline is modelled as
suggested by Illing (1995). In particular, both random exogenous shocks and fiscal discipline affect
the spending requirements of the government but outsiders (including the authorities at the
supranational level who are responsible for the FTS) cannot separately observe these two effects on
the govemment budget.
The traditional optimum currency area literature emphasises reductions in transaction costs,'
the relative importance of monetary versus real shocks, and misalignments of nominal ezchange
rates as possible arguments in favour of monetary unification.` More recent work, in contrast,
suggests that monetary unification tnay change the strategic interactions among the monetary and
fiscal authorities in a welfare-enhancing way (for example, see Beetstna and Bovenberg, 1998). The
present paper belongs to the lattec category. To our knowtedge, it is one of the first to explicitiy
model the interaction between fiscal discipline, political distortions, and moral hazard due to
international risk-sharing in the context of a monetary union. Sibert (1997) studies a two-stage game
of monetary unification, in which in the first period governments select the efficiency of the tax
z The welfaze losses due to lack ofcommitment originate in distortions in the output market. In particular, the
monetary authorities are tempted to employ surprise inflation as a way to alleviate the output-market distortions
by boosting output and employment.
' The classical contribution of Mundell (1961) employs this as the main argument in favour of monetary
unification.
' See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Chapter 9, for a comprehensive overview of the arguments in favour and
against monetary unification.5
system. However, her model differs from ours in two major respects. First, moral hazard due to
asymmetric information about fiscal discipline is absent. Second, the model dces not deal with
stabilisation issues because it abstracts from random shocks. In models without fiscal discipline,
Jensen (1997) and Kletzer (1997) explore the case for an FTS in a monetary union in which wages
and prices are sticky.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. As a
benchmark for the analysis, Section 3 studies the case with commitment for monetary policymaking
(both at the national and at the union level). Discretion is analysed in Section 4. To highlight how
the presence of an inflation target may affect the case for monetary unification, Section 5.1 explores
welfare losses and optimal institutions in the absence of an inflation target, while Section 5.2
provides a simílar analysis under the assumption that the inflation target is set optimally. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
There are n countries. Consider some country i. Following, among others, Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), Debelle (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Jensen (1994), we assume that workers in
country i are represented by trade unions whose sole objective is to achieve a target expected real
wage rate, the logazithm of which we normalise to zero. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage
rate is set equal to the expected (log of the) price level, E(p,). Expectations are rational. Hence, the
subjective price expectation of wage setters, p,`, equals the mathematical expectadon that follows
from the model, i.e. p;`-E(p,).
Output of a representative firm in country i is given by:
Y, - L,", OGrIG 1, (1)
where L, is labour.
Revenues in country i are taxed at a rate t;. The firm maximises profits (1-t)P,L"-W,L,
where P, and W, represent, respectively, the price level and the wage rate. Hence, (log) output is
given by y, -(T)I(1-r1))(n; n,`-t;flogrl), where n; denotes Ihe inflation rate, n;` represents the
expected (by wage setters) inflation rate and log(1-t,) has been approximated by -c;. For
convenience, we normalise output by subtracting the constant (rll(1-rl))logrl from y,. Moreover, we
assume that rl-'fi. Hence, normalised output, x„ amounts to6
(2)
Society i's welfare loss is given by
VS,; -~h(3,e;2 f ~~ZE[ar[? t(x;x~r], Os(i,sl, a10, (3)
where e; is the amount of fiscal discipline (or "effort") exerted by the government and where E[.]
denotes the expectations operator. Society i's losses are increasing in deviations of both inflation,
n;, from its optimum (for convenience assumed to be zero, which corresponds to price stability) and
(log) output, x„ from its optimum, z~0. The positive value for ~ reflects product or labour-market
distortions that cause the natural level of output (i.e., the level ofoutput in the absence of taxes and
inflation surprises, which has been normalised to zero) to be too low from a social perspective. The
parameter a measures the relative weight attached to inflation stabilisation versus output
stabilisation. If (3,~0, society i's losses are also increasing in fiscal discipline. Fiscal discipline may
involve, among other things, enhancing public sector efficiency and cutting subsidies to special
interest groups. Discipline, e; ~0, may be costly because it creates social tensions and unrest. This
way of modelling fiscal discipline is due to Illing (1995).
The government of country i features the following loss function
vc,, - 'fie,Z t ~fzE[an,2 t (x,~2]- (q)
The government's loss function coincides with saciery's loss function, except that the weigh[
attached to fiscal discipline may be larger. In particular, if exerting more fiscal discipline implies
cutting favours for its own constituence, the government may suffer more losses from more fiscal
discipline than sociery at large dces.
The government of country i selects its policies under the following budget constraint:
8 f Eie, - t, f Y(E~e,) - Y(~-e~, O~ysl, ís)
where g is an exogenously given, fixed component of govermnent spending and e, is a mean-zero
unexpected shock with variance a2 which, if positive, expands the govemment's need for revenues
(i.e., it worsens the fiscal situation). For convenience (and without any consequences for the main
insights from the ensuing analysis), we assume that the shocks are uncorrelated across the countries.
More discipline, e„ reduces the govetnn~nt's need for resources, for example, because it reducesbenefits to special interest groups. For analytical convenience, we assume that discipline affects the
government budget constraint linearly. The government's budget has to be balanced by tax
revenues, r;, and a net fiscal transfer y(e;-e;)-y(Ë-~. A hat above a variable denotes the average
over all countries. Hence, t:-(l~n)~~"-,e~ and é-(lin)~~"-,e~. The sum of the net transfers over all
countries, ~;"m;[y(e,-e~)-y(~-é)], is zero. Hence, the budget is balanced at the federal or
supranational level.
We assume that e; and e; are separately observable only by government i. Other authorities
only observe the combination e,-e;. An example of such a combination is an íncrease in
unemployment benefits. While such an increase may be observable to outsiders, it would be much
harder for them to infer which part of the increase is due to a truly exogenous shock and which part
is due to a lack of effort ofthe government to stem the increase in unemployment benefits. Another
example is an obsetvable fall in total tax revenues. It may be difficult to figure out which share of
the fall is due to circumstances beyond the control of the government and which shate is the result
of too little effort in collecting revenues. e; will be particularly hard to infer if a higher e, captures a
reduction in special favours to interest groups or the government's own constituency. By their
nature, these tend to be hidden from the general public.
With only the combination e;e; being observable, international transfer payments can not be
conditioned on the random shocks e, but only on the observable combinations e;e;.s Accordingly, if
the government of country i fmds itself in a precarious fiscal situation, this might be due either to
fiscal mismanagement or to an unfavourable shock beyond its control. Of course, in order to extract
more international transfers, the government would claim that its fiscal problems were due to a bad
exogenous shock rather than fiscal mismanagement.
The fiscal transfer scheme is assumed to be linear. Such a simple transfer scheme may not
be too different from what we could expect in reality. As we will see below, the optimal linear
scheme depends only on the variances of the shocks (and the model parameters) and therefore
requires very little information about the features of the distribution of the shocks.
Equation (5) implies that a share y of country i's "unluckiness" is transfered to the other
participants and vice versa. Therefore, y will be termed the degree of risk sharing among the
participants of the scheme. If y-0, risk sharing is absent, while y- 1 implies full risk sharing. This
5 The authorities at the supranational level who are responsible for operating the system of
intetnational transfer payments face a"signal extraction problem". Based on the observations e;e;,
i-1,..,n, they fotm an estimate of the e; or, equivalently, of the e;, i-1,..,n. Appendix G shows
that a linear transfer scheme based on these estimates of e„ i-1,..,n, effectively reduces to the
transfer scheme imbedded in (5).8
latter case will be referred to asftscal uniftcation. If 0 Cy c 1, the countries participate in a partial
fiscal union. We exclude negative risk sharing (yc0), which would amount to transferring even
more resources to countries that already experience a relatively favourable fiscal situation, as being
politically infeasible.ó
For future use, we rewrite (5) into a more convenient format:
8 f(1-y)(Erei) f Y(~-e~ - T~ (5')
Below it will become clear that, in equilibrium, the tax rate r; depends on e;. This suggests
that a(linear) fiscal transfer scheme based on tax rates (which are directly observable) would
dominate a scheme based on the observable combinations e;e;, i-1,..,n. However, this is not true
as we will show here. Suppose that,
g t E;e; - t; t s(~;3), ezo, (5„)
where 6(r;4) is a fiscal transfer. The idea is that, if country i is hit by a relatively bad shock, i.e.
e;~~, it has to set a relatively high tax rate, i.e. t;14. The transfer is a way to compensate country
i indirectly for its "bad luck". Take the cross-country average of (5"), 3-gf~-ë, and use it to
substitute for i in (5"). Then, by redefming y- 8l(1 f6), we arrive at an equation that reduces to
(5'). Hence, a transfer scheme based on realised tax rates is equivalent to a scheme based on the
combinations e;e;, i-1,..,n.
As far as monetary policymaking is concerned, we consider two cases, namely national
monetary policymaking within each country and central monetary policy within a monetary union.
The first case involves monetary policy being selected at the national level by an instrument-
independent central bank (see Fischer, 1995). This seems the most appropriate benchmark for
comparing national and central monetary policies because the prospective participants of the
European Monetary Union (EMU) feature independent central banks by now.
With national monetary policy, the central bank ofcountry i selects country i's inflation rate
(which it can control directly) in order to minimise the following loss function:
6 Without this constraint, it may be optimal to reduce y below zero in order to enhance fiscal discipline. As
will become clear below, even at y-o, discipline may be too low from a social perspective because the
government dces not fully intemalise the costs of lack of discipline (e.g. due to domestic political distortions
or lack of commitment). The first-order welfaze gains on account of more fiscal discipline rnay offset the
welfare losses arising from funher destabilising the economy in tlte face of country-specific shocks.9
~NCg.~ - 'hIa(nrrz;)2 f (xi~~1, (6)
where a~ represents the inflation target (see Svensson, 1997, and Beetsma and Jensen, 1998)
imposed on the central bank.'
In a monetary union, fiscal policy and fiscal discipline are selected at the national level, but
monetary policy is selected at the union level by the common central bank (CCB), which chooses
the common inflation rate so as to minimise:
yc~ - ~fi[a(n-n')z t (l~n)E,"-i(X~x)ZL (~)
The timing of events in each country is as follows. The first stage is [he institutional design
stage, in which the inflation target, n', and the degree of risk sharing, y, are chosen. Subsequently,
inflation expectations are formed and nominal wages are signed, followed by the choice of
(unobservable) fiscal discipline.e After this, the shocks to the govetnment budgets materialise.
Finally, inflation and taxes are selected and international transfers occur. At this stage, nominal
wages are taken as given.
The model allows for three distortions. The first is that the central bank is not able to
commit to a low inflation rate before infla[ion expectations as formed. Hence, the central bank takes
inflation expectations as given when setting inflation. This tempts the central bank to produce
inflation surprises to alleviate output distortions by boosting output and employment. The inflation
bias due to lack of commitment thus originates in distortions on the output market. The second
distortion is the presence of moral hazard, because shocks are not direcUy observable. Indeed,
governments do not fully internalise the costs of lack of fiscal discipline if international fiscal
traasfers allow governments to shift some of the costs to other countries. The third distortion is that
fiscal discipline is more costly for the government than for society at large. In this case, the
government can shift the cost of lack of discipline to other domestic groups. The second distortion
is present only if there is intetnational risk shazing (y ~0), while the third distortion requires that
a~~ l.
' Including discipline in the loss function of the central bank would not affect the outcomes. ihe reason is
that, when the central bank selects inflation, fiscal discipline has already been set by the govemment.
' The timing of wage setting relative to the choice of fiscal discipline is irrelevant for the outcomes, due to the
unobservability of fiscal discipline.10
3. Monetary policy commitment
As a benchmark for the more realistic case of discretionary monetary policy, we first explore the
hypothetical case in which the independent central bank is able to commit to some inflation rule.
With commitment, there is no need to impose an inflation target on the central bank to alleviate an
inflation bias. This section therefore assumes that n'-0. The inflation rule is announced after y is
chosen, but before inflation expectations are formed. The rule is assumed to be completely credible.
The commitment case should be treated mainly as a stepping stone to aid the interpretation
of the discretionary case, because the rule announced by the central bank depends on the fiscal
shocks, which were assumed to be private information of the respective governtnents.
j.l. National monetary policy
Table 1 contains the outcomes (derived in Appendix A) for the case in which monetary policy is
conducted at the national level. Inflation is zero on average, but it responds to a weighted average
of the idiosyncratic shock and the average of the shocks across the countries so as to provide the
optimal trade-off between inflation and output variabiliry. The output gap, defined as z-x;, is the
sum of a deterministic component (i.e., the tertn involving gtx) and a stochastic component (i.e.,
the term involving the realisation of the random shocks). The latter component arises because the
output gap depends on the tax rate, which absorbs part of the shocks to the government budget
constraint. Finally, because fiscal discipline is selected before the shocks occur, it consists only of a
deterministic component.
Discipline dces not affect average inflation, because the inflation rule is selected before
discipline is determined. However, the output gap is reduced by an increase ia discipline. A higher
degree of risk sharing, y, or a larger number of participants in the FTS weakens fiscal discipline
and thus raises the output gap. This is the result of a typical moral óazard problem: an increase in y
or n implies that a larger share of the increase in resources resulting from exerting fiscal discipline
accrues to other countries through the FTS. Hence, the incentive to exert fiscal discipline is
weakened.
The moral hazard problem dces not affect the stabilisation of the effective shock, (1-
y)e;ty~, i.e., the remaining part of the shock when the transfer payment is taken into account. For
a given FTS, stabilisation policy is efficient. However, an increase in n or y reduces ttte variance of
the effective shock itself.11
3.2. Monetary union
Table 1 displays also the outcomes for commitment under monetary union. On average, inflation,
output and discipline are the same as with national monetary policy. Hence, the moral hazard
problem is present in the same way as with national monetary policy. However, inflation responds
only to the average union shock, while with national monetary policymaking inflation reacts also to
the country-specific shocks.
3.3. Welfare losses
Table 3 contains the expressions for the equilibrium welfare losses in the absence of an inflation
target (n'-0). These expressions consist of a term involving (,qtx)2 (the so-called deterministic
welfare loss) and a term involving o~ (the so-called stochastic welfare loss). The deterministic
welfare loss arises also in the absence of stochastic shocks. It originates in non-tax distortions that
reduce the equilibrium level of output below its optimal level and the need to finance government
spending through distortionary taxes. The stochastic welfaze loss is due to the inabiliry to
simultaneously stabilise inflation and the output gap in the face of a quadratic loss function.
Under commitment, two distortions contribute to a lack of fiscal discipline and raise the
deterministic welfare loss. The first distortion, which originates in international risk-sharing and
fiscal discipline not being directly observable, is moral hazard in exerting fiscal discipline. The
second, domestic political, distortion is the government attaching a larger loss than society to a
given level of fiscal discipline. The first distortion vanishes if international risk-sharing is absent
(i.e. if y-0) while the second distortion is not present if the weights that the government and
society attach to fiscal discipline coincide (i.e. if (3,-1). Hence, without domestic political
distortions (i.e. if p,-1), the deterministic welfare loss achieves its minimum at y-0. The
introduction of international risk-sharing (i.e. starting from y-0) thus dces not produce any first-
order deterministic welfare losses in the absence of other distortions (due to lack of commitment or
domestic political distortions). If y-0 and a,c l, however, the introduction of intemadonal risk-
sharing yields a first-order deterministic welfare loss by worsening political distortions. Intuitively,
less fiscal discipline due to more international risk-sharing worsens the political distortion.
The compazison of the welfaze losses with decentralised and centralised monetary policies
(see Table 3) indicates that monetary unification is not attractive. The creation of a monetary union
dces not affect the deterministic welfare losses but raises the stochastic welfare losses. Stochastic
losses are larger in a monetary union because inflation can no longer be used to stabilise the12
country-specific shock components, e;~. The stabilisation role of national monetary policy is
especially valuable if shocks are large (i.e. o is large) and international risk sharing is small (i.e.
both y and n are small). With full international risk-sharing (i.e. y- I), all country-specific shocks
are completely absorbed by the FTS so that national monetary policy dces not play any role in
stabilising these shocks. In that case, therefore, giving up national monetary policy in a monetary
union dces not yield any welfare loss.
4. Discretionary monetary policy with an F'1'S
4.1. National nwnetary policy
The policy outcomes (for given n' and y) are contained in Table 2A. They are derived in Appendix
B through backwards induction. Inflation is selected taking inflation expectations and taxes as
given. Taxes are set taking fiscal discipline as given. The resulting system can then be solved for
inflation and taxes as a function of inflation expectations and fiscal discipline. When choosing fiscal
discipline, the government takes these "reaction functions" into account and, thus, acts as a
Stackelberg leader against the central bank.' When forming inflation expectations, the private sector
takes proper account of the government's optimal choice of fiscal discipline and the consequences
of this for average inflation.
In order to interpret the results, we first assume that an inflation target is absent (n'-0) and
fiscal discipline is fixed. In that case, the model corresponds to the one in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1997). Monetary policy suffers from an inflationary bias; with the same level of fiscal discipline,
inflation exceeds that under commitment. The inflationary bias originates in the, in equilibrium,
futile incentive to raise output through surprise inflation (see also Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b).
Both average inflation and the output gap fall with fiscal discipline (this can be seen when
deriving these variables -- see Appendix B). Due to moral hazard, fiscal discipline decreases in the
degree of risk sharing, y, and the number of countries participating in the FTS, n. Hence, an
increase in y or n raises average inflation and widens the average output gap.
We now turn to the case with an inflation target. A tighter inflation target (i.e., a lower
' The timing of events is important here. If inflation, taxes and discipline would all be simultaneously selected
after the shocks had occurred, the goverttment would no longer act as a Stackelberg leader against the central
bank when choosing discipline. Accordingly, the inflation target would no longer feature in the outcomes for
discipline and the output gap. Moreover, fiscal discipline would respond to the shocks. Witó the timing
assumed in this paper, discipline can be interpreted as being a structural phenomenon rather than a short-term
response to a shock.13
value for rz') reduces inflation. In fact, an inflation [arget affects the average inflation rate through
two channels. As in Svensson (1997), a tighter inflation target raises the marginal cost of inflation,
thereby inducing the central bank to select a lower inflation rate. In our model, however, it also
raises inflation indirectly through its impact on fiscal discipline. In particular, a lower inflation
target weakens fiscal discipline (see below). This, in turn, boosts infla[ion.
The indirect effect of the inflation target on discipline gives rise to a trade-off in setting the
optimal inflation target. In particular, in order to alleviate the lack of commitment in monetary
policy, the inflation target should be negative. However, imposing such a tight inflation target
weakens fiscal discipline, thereby worsening moral hazard and domestic political distortions.
Hence, in selecting the inflation target, sociery faces a trade-off between fighting the inflation bias
due to a lack of commitment and combatting the lack of discipline due to political distortions or
moral hazard.
To obtain more intuition for the impact of the inflation target on fiscal discipline, we first
inspect the reaction function of the central bank:
n, - [1~(lfa)](an'fn,`tr,tx~. (8)
Hence, both a tighter (i.e., lower) inflation target or a lower tax rate reduce the inflation rate.
Imposing a tight inflation target (n'~ 0) on the central bank drives a wedge between the inflation
preferences of the fiscal authority (which features an inflation target of zero (see (3)) and those of
the central bank. To bring inflation more in line with its own preferred rate, the fiscal authority
exploits its leadership position and reduces discipline. Hence, for the government's budget to
remain in balance, the tax rate needs to be raised, which, in turn, forces the central bank to produce
higher inflation in order to protect employment. If the relative weight in the loss function attached
to inflation stabilisation, a, gces to zero, the effect of the inflation target on fiscal discipline
vanishes. Intuitively, the fiscal authority no longer cares about inflation and, hence, perceives no
reason to use fiscal discipline as an instrument to bring inflation closer to its own preferred rate.
The adverse effect on fiscal discipline of a tighter inflation target is reduced if the degree of
risk sharing increases or if the number of participants in the FTS increases.'o The reason is as
follows. A tighter inflation target leads to less discipline and, hence, óigher taxes. The larger the
degree of risk sharing and the larger the number of participants in the FfS, the smaller the need to
raise taxes. A reduction in fiscal discipline is therefore less effective as an indirect instrument to
'o In mathematical temu, de~dn is decreasing in both y and n.14
force the central bank to raise the inflation rate.
4.2. Monetary Union
We turn now to the case of a monetary union. Hence, monetary policy is decíded at the
supranational level by a CCB that is independent from the governments of the participating
countries (which is what the Maastricht Treaty envisages for EMU).
The policy outcomes are derived in Appendix C and contained in Table 2B. In the absence
of an inflation target, n'-0, fiscal discipline is again weakened by a moral hazard problem, which
is exacerbated if y or n increases (i.e. de;ldy co and de,IdncO).
To interpret the effect of a non-zero inflation target, we inspect again the reaction function
of the CCB:
rz - [ll(Ifa)l[arz'trz`f(lln)~~"s~(titX~l. (9)
As before, a strict inflation target (rz'~0) drives a wedge between the fiscal authorities' inflation
preferences and the central bank's inflation preferences. In a monetary union, however, a unilateral
weakening of fiscal discipline is much less effective in raising the inflation rate than with national
monetary policies. In particular, the tax increase that results from less fiscal discipline exerts only a
"1 over n" effect on inflation. This weakens the incentive of the fiscal authority to weaken fiscal
discipline as an instrument to raise the inflation rate set by the CCB. Indeed, Table 2B shows that
the "1 over n" term featutes also in the effect of the inflation tatget on fiscal discipline. Hence,
although a strict inflation target (rz'c0) weakens discipline, it dces so only by a factor "1 over n".
In other words, in terms of its effect on fiscal discipline, a strict inflation target is less harmful in a
monetary union than with an independent national central bank."
4.3. Welfare losses
Welfare losses under discretion (assuming thata'-0) are reported in Table 3, both for national
monetary policy and monetary union. The inabiliry to commit introduces a third distortion in
" In a fiscal union (i.e. y-1), the effect of the inflation target on fiscal discipline is the same with national
monetary policies as in a monetary union. In that case, the effect is "1 over n" also with national monetary
policies. Intuitively, with full international risk-sharing, country-specific variations in discipline are fully
absorbed through the FTS, thereby reducing the effect on the country-specific tax rate.15
addition to moral hazard associated with intemational risk sharing (if n~ 1 and y~0) and domestic
political distortions (if p,c 1). In contrast to the commitment case, introducing international risk-
sharing (i.e. increasing y at y-0) yields a first-order loss in deterministic welfare even in the
absence of political distortions (i.e. if (i,-1). The reason is that international risk-sharing worsens a
third distortion, namely the inflation bias due to the combination of a lack of commitment and
output distortions. In particular, more risk-sharing weakens fiscal discipline. This raises inflation
expectations, which still need to be formed when the degree of risk-sharing y is selected, and thus
worsens the inflation bias.
The impact of the degree of risk sharing on the two components of the welfare loss reveals
a trade-off between reducing the deterministic and stochastic losses. In particular, more risk-sharing
raises the deterministic welfare loss by weakening fiscal discipline. The stochasác welfare loss, in
contrast, declines with international risk-sharing because more risk-sharing facilitates the
stabilisation of country-specific shocks.
Comparing the welfaze losses under commitment with those under discretion (see Table 3),
we observe that the latter losses are strictly higher for any degree of risk sharing. This is because
commitment eliminates tlte inflation bias, which serves no socially useful purpose. Hence,
commitment is socially valuable.
Under the assumption of a zero inflation target, Table 4 summarises the discussion of the
effects of the various distortions by reporting the derivative, evaluated at y-0, of the deterministic
component of the social losses with respect to y. The results apply to national monetary
policymaking and monetary union.
5. Optimal institutional design
This section explores the optimal institutional design of both fiscal and monetary policy, namely the
degree of risk-sharing by an FTS and the inflation target of the central bank.'2 First, sub-section 5.1
explores the case in which only intemational risk sharing can be set optimally at a fixed zero
inflation target. Subsequently, sub-section 5.2 allows also the inflation target to be se[ optimally.
This step-wise analysis clearly reveals that the case for monetary unification depends importantly on
whether a non-zero inflation target can be imposed on the central bank. Indeed, a monetary union
'Z A third aspect of institutional design concems the optimal number of participants in the FTS or in the
monetary union. However, we assume that the size of the union is determined by considerations outside the
model.16
can dominate national monetary policymaking in terms of social welfare only in sub-section 5.2.
5.1. No inflation target (~r-0)
The optimal degree of international risk sharing trades off the costs of less fiscal discipline (in terms
of worsening moral hazard, the inflation bias due to lack of commitment, and domestic political
distortions) and the benefits of more stabilisation of country-specific shocks. The costs of weaker
fiscal discipline rise with the revenue needs of the government, which worsens commitment
problems and raises the value of fiscal discipline in terms of reducing tax distortions. At the same
time, the benefits of stabilisation increase with the variance of the country-specific shocks.
Accordingly, if (gfx~ZlaZ is large, enhancing fiscal discipline is relatively more important than
facilitating international risk sharing. This yields the following proposition, which is formally
established in Appendix D:
Proposition 1: For any of the four possible regimes (commitment or discretion and national
monetary policy or monetary union) and in the absence of an inflation target (n'-0):
a. For large values of (gfx)2loZ," the optimal degree of risk sharing is zero, unless (3,-1 and
there is commitment. For other values of (gt~j'la', the optimal degree of risk sharing is
incomplete (OGy~`G 1) and decreasing in (gtx~2lot.
b. With initial international risk-sharing (i.e. if OGy~`G 1), more participating countries, n,
reduces the optimal degree of risk sharing (c3y`~`IanGO). At the same time, a higher value
for p, raises the optimal degree of risk sharing (c3y~`Ic3p,~0).
Complete risk sharing is never optimal (Proposition la). [ntuitively, marginally reducing
risk-sharing from full risk-sharing yields a first-order gain in deterministic welfare by strengthening
fiscal discipline but exerts only second-order effects on stochastic welfare (i.e. the derivative of the
stochastic welfare loss with respect to y is zero at y-1).
A larger union reduces the optimal degree of risk-sharing. On the one hand, a larger
number of participants in the FTS exacerbates the moral hazard problem by weakening fiscal
discipline. On the other hand, it facilitates intetnational risk-sharing as shocks can be smoothed out
"The exact conditions are the following. Conunitment with national monetary policy: (gtxj~lo'x8l[(ltl~axl-
(i,)]. Commitment with monetary union: (gtx~2la'z8l(1-(3,). Discretion and national monetary policy:
(g{-x~-~azz8~((1tl~a)(1tl~a-(3,)]. Discretion with monetary union: (gtx~ZloZZBI(ltlla-p,). Note that the rdnge
of values for (gtx~'lo' for which y~ is optimal is smaller with monetary union than with national monetary
policy.l7
over more countries. Whereas the costs of additional risk-sharing thus rise, the benefits fall. Hence,
the optimal degree of international risk-sharing declines.
An increase in p, implies that the domestic political distortions associated with a lack of
fiscal discipline become less important. The weakening of fiscal discipline associated with moral
hazard is thus less harmful in terms of worsening political distortions. The associated smaller costs
of moral hazard allow for an increase in the optimal degree of international risk sharing.
The following proposition compares a monetary union and a system of independent national
central banks. It also compares the optimal degree of international risk sharing under commitment
and discretion.
Proposition 2: Suppose that rt'-0.
a. Both under commitment and discretion a system of independent national central banks is
strictly preferable to a monetary union.
b. If, under commitment, (gtx~zia2 c 8i(1-p,), or, under discretion, (gfx721a2G Si(1 t lla-p~,
the optimal degree of international risk shazing is strictly higher under a monetary union.
c. If (gfz)zlaZ~8l(lflla)(1-(f,) for a system of independent national central banks or
(gt~21o'c8l(1-ji,) for a monetary union, then the optimal degree of risk sharing is higher
under commitment than under discretion.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix E. Proposition 2a can be interpreted as follows.
For a given degree of international risk sharing, monetary unification dces not affect deterministic
welfare. Stochastic losses, in contrast, rise because national monetary policy can no longer be
employed to stabilise the idiosyncratic shock components, e;~. Hence, for a given degree of risk
sharing (and, therefore, also for the degree of risk sharing that is optimal under a monetary union),
welfare losses are higher under a monetary union than with national policymaking. Only under
complete internationational risk-sharing (i.e. y-1) would national monetary policy aot add any
stabilisation benefits. Proposition la established, however, that complete risk sharing cannot be
optimal because of moral hazard.
The intuition behind Proposition 26 is that in a monetazy union the FTS has to take over
part of the role of national monetary policies in stabilising country-specific shock components.
Hence, in accordance with common wisdom, monetary unification should be accompanied by larger
international transfers. However, the welfare losses from weaker fiscal discipline may be so large
that no international risk sharing may actually be optimal not only under national but also
centralised monetary policymaking. This is the case if (gtx)ZIaZ is sufficiently high while either18
commitment is absent or political distortions are present (i.e. [i,cl). In that case, weaker fiscal
discipline due to moral hazard worsens existing domestic political distortions or the inflation bias
due to lack of commitment. Hence, it is optimal to refrain from intemational risk sharing despite its
stabilisation benefits.
The reason behind Proposition 2c is that moral hazard is less cosdy under commitment
because the associated weakening of fiscal discipline dces not exacerbate the inflation bias due to
lack ofcommitment.
5.2. An infZation target
This sub-section explores the optimal institutional design if in addition to the degree of international
risk sharing also the inflation target can be freely set to minimise society's welfare losses. A non-
zero inflation target is optimal only if the central bank cannot commit to an inflation rule. In that
case, the inflation target plays a socially useful tule in fighting the inflation bias.
This sub-section shows that an optimal non-zero inflation target may overturn the result
from the previous sub-section that monetary unification is never optimal. Since a non-zero inflation
target can be optimal only under discretion, the case for monetary union thus requires a lack of
commitment. This sub-section focusses on the case with discretion.
The inflation target affects only the deterministic components of the policy outcomes.
Hence, the optimal inflation target follows from the first-order condition:"
R, e; de,lc3n; f a E[n,] dn;ldn; t E[s-x;] d(i-x;)lan; - 0, (10)
where, in the case of a monetary union, n; is the common inflation rate and n; the inflation target
imposed on the CCB. Using the outcomes in Table 2, we can solve (10) for the optimal inflation
targets to be imposed on the national central banks or the CCB. The expressions for these targets as
a function of international risk-sharing, y, are presented in Table 5. They give rise to the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: Both with and without monetary unification, the optimal inflation target is negative
and is decreasing in p, in the presence of discretionary monetary policy.
" The quadratic nature ofthe loss fitnctioa ensures that the second-order condition for aminimum is met.19
Under both monetary arrangements, it is optimal to impose an inflation target below the socially
optimal inflation rate of zero. This is in line with the findings of Svensson (1997). Intuitively, the
negative inflation target helps to offset the inflation bias due to discretionary monetary policy.
The optimal inflation target is stricter (i.e. more negative) if society attaches substantial
costs to fiscal discipline so that domestic political distortions ate smaller (i.e. p, is large). The
reason is that a stricter (i.e. lower) inflation target weakens fiscal discipline. The indirect costs of a
stricter inflation target in terms of weaker fiscal discipline are smaller if sociery experiences
substantial losses for exerting fiscal discipline.
The expressions for the optimal inflation target are rather complicated and uninformative.
For the case of p,-0, however, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition4: Suppose that p,-0 and that intetnational risk sharing is not necessarily set optimally.
Both with and without monetary unification, a higher degree of international risk sharing, y,
tightens the optimal inflation target.
The intuidon behind Proposition 4 is that, by worsening the moral hazard problem, a higher y
weakens fiscal discipline and thus raises the tax level. To protect employment in the face of a
higher tax rate, the central bank is more tempted to produce an inflation surprise, thereby
worsening the inflation bias. To offset the stronger incentive for a surprise inflation, society fmds it
optimal to tighten the inflation target.
By substituting the expressions for the optimal inflation target (Tabie 5) into the expressions
for inflation and the output gap, we can express sociery's equilibrium welfare loss under an optimal
inflation target as a function of y. These functions are in general complicated and will be
investigated numerically (see below). However, for the special case of (3,-0, Table 6 provides
analytical expressions for the welfare losses. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition S: Let n~l and p,-0 and suppose that the optimal inflation target (given y) is
imposed. Both for a system of independent national central banks and for a monetary union, the
optitnal degree of international risk sharing is zero for relatively lazge values of (gtx~2la2. For
lower values of (gf~jZlo2, partial risk sharing is optimal (i.e., OGy~G 1), with the optimal degree
of risk sharing being decreasing in (gfx72lo2.'s
" For the case of independent national central banks (and ji,-0), zero risk shazing is optimal if and only if
(gfx)~~aZ z(4f lla)'l2(1 tl~a)z.zo
This proposition (which is proven in Appendix F) shows that, for (3,-0, the basic trade off in the
choice of y between weakening fiscal discipline and facilita[ing risk sharing survives if the inflation
target is set optimally. As before, the deterministic welfare loss is increasing in y, while the
stochastic welfare loss (which is the same as before) is decreasing in y(y c 1).
We now turn to the question whether monetary unification can be optimal. A tight inflation target
(i.e. n'c0) weakens fiscal discipline (see sub-section 4.1), but tess so in a monetary union (see
sub-section 4.2). Indeed, for a given target n'c0 and y, more fiscal discipline under a monetary
union produces lower average inflation and a lower average output gap than under na[ional
monetary policymaking. In this way, the possibiliry of imposing a strict inflaáon target aimed at
alleviating the inflation bias due to discretionary monetary policy makes a monetary union more
attractive. However, while a monetary union may be preferable in terms of average inflation and
output, it performs worse in terms of stabilisation policy.
To illustrate this trade-off between decentralised and centralised monetary policy, we resort
to numerical computations and take any possible combination of p„ a, n and (gtz~ZlaZ, where p, E
{0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}, a E {0.1,0.5,1,2,10}, n E {1,2,5,11,15} and (gt~~laZ E
{0.01,0.1,1,10,100}. The case with n-11 corresponds to the initial number of EMU participants,
while n-15 is the total number ofcountries currently in the European Union.
Table 7 reports, for a number of parameter combinations, the optimal value of y and the
associated welfare loss (divided by o~), both for monetary union and a system of independent
national central banks. For the case of monetary union, the table also reports the optimal inflation
target, the averages of inflation, the output gap and discipline (all divided by gt~, the
deterniinistic and stochastic welfare losses (all divided by a2), and the ratio of the welfare loss under
monetary union divided by the welfare loss under national monetary policy. The table presents
results for the two extreme values of (3, (i.e. (i,-0 and p,-1).
Table 7 assumes that a-1 so that society attaches an equal loss to a one-percent deviation
in either inflation or output from its socially optimal level. Moreover, we vary the number of
countries from 2(a "mini-union") to IS and we vary (gfx~Zlo2 from 0.01 to 100. Table 7a assumes
that (i,-0, when society always prefers more fiscal discipline. Table 7b, in contrast, assumes that
p,-1, when fiscal discipline affects society's loss to the same extent as it affects the government's
loss.
The results of the numerical exercise can be summarised as follows:
Result 1: Summary of numerical results. For any of the parameter combinations that we investigatezl
we find that:
a. The social welfare loss is lower under monetary union than under a system of independent
national central banks.
b. Unless it is already equal to zero, the optitnal degree of risk sharing is decreasing in
(gfx~2loZ.
c. The optimal degtee of risk sharing is as high or higher under a monetary union than under a
system ofindependent national central banks.
d. Under national monetary policy, welfare losses are decreasing in tr, if (gtz~2lot is not too
large. Under a monetary union, welfare losses are always decreasing in n, ceteris paribus.
Hence, for any of the investigated parameter combinations, monetary unification outperforms a
system of independent national central banks. In particular, monetary union dominates decentralised
monetary policy even if a,-1. The reason is that monetary unification allows for a stricter infladon
target without substantially weakening fiscal discipline. As a result, fiscal discipline is stronger and
the average inflation and output gap stnaller in a monetary union. Accordingly, a monetary union
benefits from smaller deterministic losses on account of a smaller inflation bias, less moral hazard,
and less dotnestic political distortions. A larger value of (gfx~zla' raises the losses from the
inability to commit, the presence of moral hazard, and (if (3,~ 1) domestic political distortions. This
makes not only international risk-sharing less aaractive but also makes monetary unification more
attractive. Accordingly, if labour markets distortions and spending requirements are sufficiently
important compared to the variance of the shocks, then monetary union without an F'I'S is the
optimal arrangement.1ó Table 7 shows some cases, for p,-0 as well as p,-1 in which monetary
union without an F'I'S is the optimal arrangement. In all of these cases, (gtz)zlo' is relatively large.
As already mentioned, the numerical results show that monetary unification dominates an
arrangement with independent national central banks even if (gfx7'lo2 is stttall. The intuition is that
in that case it is optimal to have substantial fiscal risk-sharing (i.e. y is high) and, hence, the loss in
terms ofless efficient stabilisation from giving up an independent monetary policy is only small.
Resu[t Ib extends Proposition la to the case when the inflation target is optimally chosen.
Result Ic confitms the result for the case n'-0 contained in Proposition 26. As before, the FTS
appropriates part of the stabilisation task originally performed by national monetary policy. Another
16 Note, however, that if we restrict y to zero, it is easy to see that monetary unificadon can be dominated by
national monetary policymaking. This is the case if (gtx~~laZ is sufficiently small.22
reason why the optimal degree of risk sharing is higher undec a monetary union is that imposing a
negative inflation target is less costly in terms of lower discipline. This provides scope for
additional risk sharing. The intuition behind Resulr ld is as follows. If (g-f-x7Zlo2 is not too large
and, hence, the optimal degree of risk sharing is positive, a larger group of participants implies Ihat
the same stabilisation gains can be obtained with a reduction in y, which, in turn, reduces the
deterministic welfare loss. In the case of a monetary union, the welfare enhancing effect of a larger
union ís supported also by a weakening of the adverse effect of a tight inflation target on fiscal
discipline. This effect remains present also if (gfx~ZloZ is relatively large and the optimal degree of
risk sharing is zero.
6. Conclusions
Common wisdom about the link between monetary and fiscal unification focusses on stabilisation
considerations. These considerations imply that a monetary union can be optitnal only in the
presence of a fiscal union in which internationa! transfers substitute for national monetary policies
in stabilising country-specific shocks. Indeed, stabilisation considerations would generally argue in
favour of both international transfers and national monetary policies (i.e. a fiscal union without a
monetary union). This paper establishes that lack of both commitment and fiscal discipline provide
atguments that go exactly the other way by providing a case in favour of monetary unification but
against fiscal unification."
The case for monetary union without a fiscal union depends on the combination of a lack of
fiscal discipline due to moral hazard, a lack of commitment, and the presence of distortions in the
output market. Without moral hazard, full risk-sharing would not impose any costs. Hence, a fiscal
union would be optimal. With commitment or in the absence of output distortions, monetary
unification would not provide any benefits because an inflation target would be unnecessary as an
instrument to fight the inflation bias. Accordingly, the benefits of monetary union in terms of
weakening the adverse consequences of an inflation target on fiscal discipline would be absent.
A monetary union without a fiscal union is optimal if both lack of commitment of monetary
" Two additional considerations strengthen the case for monetary unification further. First, we have compared
monetary unification with the best-available altemative based on national monetary policymaking. However,
setting up an FTS may well be (politically) easier if it is accompanied by monetary unificauon. Hence, if
(partiap risk sharing is optimal, this would constitute another advantage in favour of monetary unification.
Second, it may be easier to impose a(credible) inflation target in the case of a monetary union than with
national monetary policymaking. The reason is that in a monetary union the central bank is removed further
from the direct influence ofthe national govemments.23
policy and lack of discipline of fiscal policy are serious. Commitment problems are impor[ant if
monetary authorities are tempted to boost output in view of large non-tax distortions and large
spending requirements producing serious tax distortions. These output distortions exacerbate also
the problem of lack of fiscal discipline, which is also worsened by domestic political distortions.
These conditions for a monetary union but against a fiscal union are likely to be met in
Europe. In particular, European economies suffer from serious distortions in labour markets while
high public spending gives rise to substantial tax distortions. Moreover, lack of risk-sharing through
private capital markets in Europe tnay be due to the same reason why international public transfers
tnay be unattractive in Europe, natnely lack of transparency and asymmetric inforrnation (see also
Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996). Indeed, moral hazard due to international transfers seems to be a
potentially important issue because of lack of transparancy of budgeting processes. This lack of
transparancy contributes also to political distortions weakening fiscal discipline.
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A: Derivations of commitmenr outcomes.
First, the central bank announces an inflation rule (to which it will stick). Then, inflation
expectations are formed. Third, discipline is chosen. Fourth, the shocks occur. Finally, taxes and
inflation are selected and transfer payments take place.
A.1. System of independent national central banks
The central bank ofcountry i announces an inflation rule of the following format:
rt, - S,E; t 82~.
Hence, n,`-o. Combining (A.1), (2) and (5), we have:
X-x, - 8 f X-(1-Y)e~ - Ye t(1-Y-ó~)E~ t(Y-ó~~.
(A.1)
(A.2)






where we have used that, in equilibrium, all govertunents choose the same level of fiscal discipline
(this is easy to show').
Because the inflation rule dces not affect discipline, the central bank, in selecting the
inflation rule, chooses 8, and bZ so as to minimise:
'fi E [ a(ó,e,tó2~)~ f ((1-Y-S,)Erf(Y-bz)~)2 ].
' Some manipulation shows that the fust-order condition for the choice of qcan be written as {1-[1-y(n-
l)In](1-y)} e, -[yé-(gt~][1-y(n-1)In]. As this equation holds for all i-1,..,n, it follows immediately that
e~-e;,j-1,..,n. A similaz reasoning can be used to show that the equilibria for the other cases considered in
the paper (and which are derived below) are symmetric in the sense that each govemment selects the same
amount of fiscal discipline.
1The first-order conditions are:
E [ a(á,E;fó2~)Ei - ((1-Y-á~)E~f(Y-b2)~)EI J - 0~
E [ a(S,e;fáZÉ)~ - ííl-Y-á,)E~f(Y-áZ)~)~ ] - 0.
Using that E[~e;] - E[È2] - a2ln, it is easy to show Ihat S,-(1-y)I(lfa) and áz-Yl(lta). Using
(A.3), it is also easy to check that the outcomes for inflation and the output gap are those that are
given in Table 1.
A.2. Monetary union
Completely analogous.
B: Derivation of outcomes for a system ofnational central banks combined with FlS
The central bank minimises 'Iz[a(a;-a, )2f(x;X~z] over rt;, subject to (2). The first-order condition
can be written as:
rz; - [ll(lta)](arz; ft;tzfn,~,
Rewrite the government budget constraint (5') as:
t;fz - gfz f(I-Y)(Ei e~) f Y(~-e~.
Substitute (B.2) into (B.1) and rewrite to give:










Substitute the right-hand sides of (B.2) and (B.3) for (t;tx~ and a;, respectively, into the equation
s-x;-(i;tx~-(rz,-rz;~, which we can then rewrite to give:
s-x, -( 1
tUa)'(8'x'rz~)t(1-Y)(E;-e;)tY(~-ê)) - I 1 tlla)
a; . (B.5)
2Hence,
Going back along the game tree, the government minimises 'he,? t'fzE[an;f(z-x)2] over e„
subject to (B.3) -(B.6), taking a,` as given. The first-order condition can be written as:
e; t aE[tt,](dn;h3e;) - E[z-x;](dx;lde,)] - 0, (B.7)
[t is easy to show that, in equilibrium, each government selects the same amount of fiscal discipline.
Hence, from (B.3) and (B.5) we have, respectively:
E[rz ]- r Ila 1(.tztn`-e,l } r 1 1 rz; , (6.8)
l ltllaJlK I l ttllaJ
E[x-x;] 1 (gtstn`-e;) 1 rz; .
- i t lla l tlla
where we have tnade use of the assumption that expectations formed about discipline are rational
(e,`-e,). Substitute (B.4), (B.6), (B.8) and (B.9) into (B.7) and rewrite to give:
ef - r 1-y(n-l~nl~.z-e;tn;).
l Itlla J
Take expectations of (B.3) and solve to give:
n` - (Ila)~gtz-e,) t n; ,
a(aex )- ( 1 t 1la )(




where we have again used that expectations are rational (hence, wage setters anticipate correctly the
level of fiscal discipline) and that the equilibrium is symmetria Substitute (B.11) into (B.10). Some
algebra then yields:
Hence,
r 1-y(n-1)Inl . B.12 e, -(1-y(n-l~n)~ts-e,~ t
l J
rz. ( )
1 t l la




D - (ltlla)(2-y(n-1)In). (B.14)
3which is the solution for e, as given in Table 2A.
Substitute the right-hand side of (B.11) into (B.3). Next, substitute into the resulting
equation the right-hand side of (B.13) for e; and ë. Solving yields the solution for n; as given in
Table 2A. Finally, rewrite (6.2) as:
t,tztn; - grztnet(l-Y)(E,-e,)`Y(~-ê).
Subtract this expression from (B.3) and use thatz-x;-(r;tz-l-n,~-n; (from (2)) in order to give:
z-x, --I 1 1lgtztn;-e;t(1-y)e,tyÊ) t( 1 ln„
l ltlla lltllaJ
where we have used the cross-country symmetry in terms of the choice of fiscal discipline.
Substitute into this equation the right-hand side of (B.11) for n;`. Next, eliminate e, from the
resulting equation by substituting the right-hand side of (B.13).
Set n; -0. Society's welfare loss as given in Table 3 then follows upon substitution of the
solutions for e;, a; and z-x; into 'fzp,e,?f'hE[aa2f(zz,)Z]. The deterministic welfare loss is easy to
derive. The stochastic welfare loss involves working out:
1 E~(1-y)e~tyÊ~ -
1 t l la






C: Derivation of the outcomes for a ntonetary union with FTS
The common central bank (CCB) minimises over n(the union-wide inflation rate) and subject to
(2), i-1,..,n, the following objective function:
'hE[a(rt-n')2 f (lln)~~"-i(x~X~21. (C.1)
The first-order condition is:
4a(n-a') t (a-n~ - (lln)~,i~,(t;tx) - 4fz, (C.2)
where 4-(lln)~;".,r;. Combine this with the govemment budget constraint.
g t(1-Y)(Eie,) t Y(~-e~ - t;. (5~)
in order to eliminate n and rewrite the result to give
(lta)(r;tx~ t tc(4tx~- (lta)[(gtxj f(1-Y)(Eie;) f Y(~-e~]. (C.3)
Take averages of the left- and right-hand sides of (C.3) and rewrite the result to give:
4.x - gtztÊ-ê.
Substitute the (C.4) into (C.2) and rewrite to give:
n- r 1 1~. t r l~a 1(Stztrt`ts'-é).
11 ltllal l ltllaJ
Hence.
c3n 1 r lla 1




From the govetnment budget constraint we have
r,-i-x - (8fx~ -F (1-Y)(Eie~) f Y(~-~ .
Substitute this into the right-hand side ofzX;-(t,fx~-(n-rr~ to give:
x-x; - ir` - ir f(gfx~ f(1-Y)(Eie,) f Y(é-~.
Substitute (C.5) for n into (C.7) and manipulate to give:




n- I 1 t~(n-1 ~nya




sGoing back along the game tree, the government minimises 'áe,Z t 'hE[anZf(x,-x~Z] over e„
subject to (C.5), (C.6), (C.8) and (C.9), taking n` as given. The first-order condition can be written
as:
e; t aE[rt;](da~de;) tE[x;xJ(ax,~ae,) - 0, (C.10)
Substitute from (C.5), (C.6), (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.10). Work out the expectations and use
rationality (e;`-e;) and that e~-e„ for all j-1,..,n (again, this is easy to show). Some manipulation
then yields:
r (y-lxn-l~nl , ( 1-y(n-1)Inl
] tlla l t lla l J ~ ` l J ~}x}R`-e~~.
(C.11)
Take expectations of the left- and right-hand side of (C.5). Using the assumption that wage
setters' expectations are rational and the result that eJ-e;, for allj-1,..,n, we have:
n` - rt' t (Ila)(gts-e;). (C.12)
Substitute (C.12) into (C.11) and solve to give the solution for e; as contained in Table 2B. The
solutions for n and s-x; are equally straightforward (although cumbersome): to obtain the solution
for inflation, substitute the right-hand side of (C.12) into (C.5). Into this result substimte the
solution for e;, where we make use of the result that e~-e„ for all j-1,..,n. To obtain the solution
of zz;, substitute the right-hand side of (C.12) into (C.8). Using again that e~-e;, for all j-1,..,n,
and substituting the solution for e; into the resulting equation we obtain (after some algebra) the
solution for z-x;.
Set a'-0. Society's welfare loss as given in Table 3 follows upon substitudon of the
solutions for n and s-x; into 'Izji,e,?f'hE[an2f(x;x~z]. The deterministic welfare loss is easy to
derive. The stochastic term involves working out
Ila 2 (( lla Z E Ê } ll
-yl~-(1-y)e;l l. (C.13)
(ltlla~ ltlla J J J
This is straightforward, but somewhat cumbersome.
D. Proofof Proposition 1
We introduce the following notation. Vs~c is society's equilibrium loss under an independent national
central battk which is able to commit. VSD is the corresponding loss under discretion. VSUC is
6sociery's loss under monetary union and commitment, while VSUD is society's loss under monetary
union with discretion. The corresponding expressions are given in Table 3. Assume that n'-0 and,
for the case of commitment, that [i, c 1.
One has:
c3Vs~~ [1-[i,(1-y(n-I)rn)J(n-I~n




aY - (2-y(n-I)1n]' ,
aVsD [Itlla-[i,(I-y(n-1)rn)](n-1)In
r7Y - [ (2-y(n-1)M]'









~tx~ t ((n-1)lnloz ~ p,
Il ltlla J
~Vs~ - f[(n-1)In]z~3tp,(-It2y(n-1)rn)~




Kgtx~ t [(n-I~n]oz ~ 0,
f [(n-1)In]z~3(1 tlla)t[3a(-I t2y(n-I)In)~
ózVsrD - ~[(n-1)In]z~3(Itlla)tp~(-It2y(n-1)rn)~
ózy (2 -y(n- 1 )rn)a
~rx,~ 4 `(n-l~nloz ~ 0,
l Itlla J









Hence, the derivatives of VSc, Vsuc VSo and VSUD with respect to y are all strictly increasing for the
range Osys 1.
Hence, if aVs Idy ~r.az0 (where the """ denotes any of the regimes IC, UC, ID or UD), we
have y`~`-0. From (D.1) -(D.4) we see immediately that this condition reduces to
(gf~zlozi8![(Iflla)(1-[3,)] for IC, to (gfxjzlazi8l(1-[f,) for UC, to
(gtx~zlazi8l[(1 t 1!a)(1 f 1!a-[i,)] for ID, and to (gfx~zla2z8l(1 t lla-[i~) for UD.
If this condition dces not hold, we have aVs!ay~yaot0. Moreover, from (D.2) we have
(2-y(n -1)In)"
7that dVs'Idy~Y-,10. Hence, if the above condition dces not hold, then 0 G y~`G I.
From (D.1), if (gtx~Zla2G8l[(1 t lla)(1-p,)], then, for [C, y~` is implicitly defined by:
1-[i..~l -y`~`(n-1)In) (g.x-~z 1-y"a
D.9
~2-y"o`(n-1)In~' , oZ ]tlla~ ( )
From (D.2), if (gtx~ZlaZG8l(1-[i,), then, for UC, y~` is implicitly defined by:
~1-a..~l -y`p(n- I )In~l(gtx-~ - l -y"a (D.10)
~2-y'p(n-I)In~3 JI o-
From (D.3), if (gfx~zlo2 G 8!(1 f lla)(1 f l la-p,), then, for ID, y~` is implicitly defined by:
Itlla-(3~~1-y"r`(n-1)In~ (gtx-~ l-y~`
~2-y"~`(n- I)In~l oZ - I t 1 la ~
From (D.4), if (gfx~2la~G 8l(I flla-(i,), then, for UD, y~ is implicitly defined by:




We see immediately that, for (D.9) -(D.12) to continue to hold, an increase in (gfx~2loZ or an
increase in n requires a fall in y~`, while an increase in ar requires a rise in y~`.
E. Proofof Proposition 2
Assume that n'-0 and, for the case ofcommitment, that [isG 1.
Part a: Explained in the text.
Part b: From the proof of Proposition I it follows immedia[ely that, if 8l[(1 f lla)(1-
(3,)]s(g-~x~ZlaZG8l(1-(3,) for conunitment and if 8l[(lflla)(Itlla-(3,)]s(gtx~~lo2G8l(ltUa-[i,)
for discretion, y~` is higher under monetary union than with an independent, national central bank.
If (gfx)ZIo2G8l(lflla)(1-p,), y~' under an [C is determined by (D.9) and y~ under UC is
determined by (D.10). Take the value for y which is optimal undet IC. That is, (D.9) holds.
Hence, for this value of y the left-hand side of (D.10) would be smaller than the right-hand side of
(D.10). For (D.10) to hold, y has to increase furthet. A similar reasoning holds for discretion.
8Part c: For example, for the case of independent national central banks, if (gtx~zloZZ8l[(1 t lla)(1-
~3,)] the optimal degree of risk sharing is zero both under commitment and discretion. If
8l[(ltlla)(ltlla-(i,)]s(gfx)zlo'G8l[(Itlla)(1-~3,)], the optimal degree of risk sharing is zero
under discretion and positive under commitment. Otherwise, we need to compare (D.9) and (D.11).
Suppose that (D.9) holds. Then, the left-hand side of (D.11) exceeds its right-hand side. Hence, the
optimal degree of risk sharing under discretion is lower than under commitment. For the case of
monetary union, the proof is similar.
F. Proofof Proposition S
Consider first the case of a national, independent central bank. Using the expression for society's
loss in Table 6, we have:
r óVc (1tl~axltYxn-l~n ~tx.~ ( n-1 I
(1-y)oz,




1n-lll 1 1oz~ n z J n I tlla
where y - 1-y(n-1)In 10.
An internal optimum for y requires that the right-hand side of (F.1) be zero:
(ItllaxltY)
~tx~ - ( I l(I-y)oZ,
((I ty)zt lla~ l l f llal
hence,
(g,x-~z - ((1 .y~.lla}z
(1 Y )oz





Substitute this into the right-hand side of (F.2) to give an expression which can be written as ((n-
1)In)a' times:
(3(l.y)z-llakl-yxn-1)In t ~ 1 1 -
~(lty)ztllakltllakl}Y) ) 1tVaJ
(3(lty)z-Ilakl-yxn-l~nt~(lty)ztllakltY) ~ 0.
((t ty)zt I lak1 tllak I ty)
Hence, for any 0 ~ y c 1 for which VS is flat we have a minimum. By continuiry of dVSIc3y, there
9can only be one such point on the interval OGy G 1. Note, furthermore, that dVs`Idy~Y~, ~0. Hence,




(ltlla)(1'Y) (g'xÍZ - ~
ltlla)(1
Y) - 0,
-((l.y)'- t lla}z ) oz
when evaluated at an internal optimum, 0G y~` G 1. Hence, at an internal optimum we have that
dyld[(gtxjzlaz]~y-7~, - -{dWld[(gtxjzlaz]}I{aWldy}IY~Tq„ ~ 0,
because dWld[(gfx~Z]Ia210 and c3WIc7ylr-roa~0.
Now, consider the case of a monetary union. Using the expression for society's loss in Table 6, we
have:
u
dvc (l tlla)(llnt(I tllak)(n-1)In ~tx.~ - ( n-11(1-y)az,
dY - ~llnzt(2In)zt(ltlla)zz~ I` n J
(F.5)
aZv~u -~ (1 tl~a)((n-1)M)zw 1~ix.~ t r n-11oz ~ 0 (F.6)
azY ~llnzt(2In)zt(Itlla)zz~1 l n J
where z - If(1-y)(n-1)~nzl and w-(3-lla)lnz f 6(]tlla)zln f 3(lflla)zzz 10. If(gtx~2la2 is
sufficiently large, dVsUldy~Y~o z0. Hence, combining with (F.6), we have that y~`-0 if (gfx~Zloz is




(lln z t(2In)z"P` ~(l t Ila)~Zoe`~~
where f" - z~Y-r~,. An increase in y raises the left-hand side of (F.7) and reduces its right-hand
side. Hence, an increase in (gtx~1loz implies a fall in the optimal degree of risk sharing, y~.
C: Fxplicit treatment of the signal extraction problem at the supranational level:
Because of the unobservability of the shocks the federal authorities responsible for the federal
transfers face a signal extraction problem: on the basis of the observations c,-e,-e„ they form an
estimate e,` of e„ or, alternatively, an estimate e;`-c;fe,`-e;e,te,` of e,. Transfers then take place
10on the basís of the estimates E,`, i-1,..,n. The budget constraint of government i is given by:
ó f E; - C, - T; f Y(E `-E"). (G. I)
where a hat above a variable again denotes the cross-country average.
Because e; is selected before E; occurs, we conjecture that the federal authorities estimate e;
to be the same constant k for all i, i.e. e;`-k. This conjecture needs to be confirmed, i.e., we need
to show that, in equilibrium, the fiscal authorities behave in such a way that e; is a constant k.
Substituting E~-E~e;fk and ~`-~-ètk into (G.1), the government budget constraint
reduces to (5) or (5') in the text (because k drops out). Hence, for each of the relevant cases
considered in the paper (i.e., discretion with national monetary policy or with monetary
unification), the outcomes are unchanged. Because we found that for each of these cases the
outcome for e, was a constant (see Tables 1 and 2), our conjecture was correct: the federal
authorities simply estimate e, to be equal to the solution given in Table 1 or 2(depending on the
specific case being considered) in the paper. This is the'v best estimate and it is exactly correct in
equilibrium.
11Table 1: Equilibrium policy outcomes uuder commitment (rz-0).





l ltlla lla 1
I 1 1~Stx.~ ' I 1 1 r(1 Y)E,tY~I
l 1
r 1 1~tx~ r Ila -Yl ~ t(1-y)e~
~x 12-y(n-I~nJ l ltllal l2-y(n-l~nJ l lflla J
r 1-y(n-l~nl~tx.~ ( 1-y(n-1)Inl~~x~
e~ l 2-y(n -1~n J l 2-y(n-1)InJTable 2: Equilibrium policy outcomes under discretion
A. National monetary policynwking witó independent centralóanks:
Variable:
~ Íl tlla).(1-Y(n-1)In) la 1 }x }~ lla I 1- e t e'
~(
Y) , Y~
~~ ~, } n
)
D 2- n-I In1 ltllaJ l Y( 1
l-Y(n-1)rn -
1)~(1 Y)E,'YE~ 1 ~. r (B}x1 r z-x D 2- n-1 In 1 tlla 1 l Y( l ) I l
r 1-y(n-1)Inl n, t r 1-Y(n-1)Inl ~t ~
x
e
D 2- n-lln t J l J
Note: D - [1 tlla][2-Y(n-1)ln].B. monetary union:
Variable:
r llnt(1 t(1-yxn-l~n)(l tlla) ia 1~tx.) t r lla 1 Ê
rz. } n
~
l D 2- n-1 nJ l ltllaJ l Y( I
-r Iln 1 1 ~tx.~ - r lla -Yl ~,(1-Y~e~
~. } ~x l D 2- n-IynJ l ltlla J l Y( l
lln ,~, } 1-y(n-l~n ~tx~
( ) e D 2-y(n-l~nTable 3: Equilibrium social welfare losses (n'-0).
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Inde ndent national central bank, discretion:
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oTable 4: Evaluation of aVs,~dy at y-0 (national monetary policy and monetary union).








(1 tlla)~1 t 1la t(3,(I -y(n -1)In~~
-[(I tj~,Xl -y(n-1)In~ ta(llat2-y(n-1)~n}~
Monetary union ar(I f 1IaXI-y(n - Iyn)In t(1 tlla)2(I t(1-yxn-1 ~n)
tx~
[ (lt(i,)InZta[llnt(It(1-yxn-1)Inkltlla)~ -Table 6: Equilibrium social loss under optimal inflation targets ((3,-0).
National mon. policy
Monetary union
I~ ltlla 1(g.x)z t( 1 1((1-y)Z(n-llt~lo~
2(2-y(n-1)In~ztllaJ `2(1 t1la~J l ` n J n J
1 Itlla
~,x~ t~ 1 oZ t(1-y)Z n-1
Z (2-y(n-1)In~t(1laXlt(1-yxn-1)In~ 2(ltlla)) n ( 2n )Tade 7: Numerical comparison oetio~nl morcury policy and rtaoemry unioa for various parameter wmbuuuiom (a-1).
a:p,~o
No uuion Mo union















2 0.01 0.994 0.128 0.993 -0.615 0.153 0.768 0.232 0.0031 0.125 0.128 1.00
2 0.1 0.945 0.155 0.953 -0.613 O.149 0.757 0.243 0.0297 0.126 0.155 0.999
2 1 0.561 0.402 0.669 -0.615 O.121 0.685 0.315 0.242 0.152 0.394 0.981
2 10 0.000 2.25 0.000 -0.615 0.080 0.560 0.440 1.60 0.375 1.98 0.878
2 100 0.000 20.25 0.000 -0.613 0.080 0.560 0.440 16.0 0.375 16.4 0.809
5 0.01 0.992 0.0541 0.993 -0.820 0.081 0.697 O.I03 0.004t 0.0500 0.0541 I.00
S 0.1 0.923 0.0898 0.935 -0.820 0.075 0.862 O.138 0.0374 0.0517 0.0891 0.992
S l 0.497 0.381 0.634 -0.820 0.051 0.714 0.286 0.256 0.104 0.360 0.945
S IO 0.000 2.25 0.000 -0.820 0.028 0.525 0.473 1.38 0.450 1.83 0.814
5 l00 0.000 20.25 0.000 -0.820 0.028 0.525 0.475 13.8 0.450 14.3 0.704
I1 0.01 0.991 0.0273 0.991 -0.913 0.041 0.947 0.033 0.0045 OA228 0.0273 1.00
ll 0.1 0.916 0.0667 0.927 -0.913 0.037 0.898 0.102 0.0404 0.0252 0.0655 0.983
II 1 0.467 0.374 0.625 -0.913 0.024 0.721 0.279 0.260 0.0867 0.347 0.925
ll 10 0.000 2.25 0.000 -0.913 0.012 0.5I1 0.489 1.31 11.477 1.79 0.794
1t 100 0.000 20.23 0.000 -0.913 0.012 O.SII 0.4g9 13.1 0.477 13.6 0.670
13 0.01 0.991 0.0213 0.991 -0.936 0.031 0.939 0.047 0.0046 O.Ot67 0.0213 1.00
IS O.l 0.914 0.06I6 0.926 -0.936 0.027 0.906 0.094 0.0411 0.0192 0.0603 0.980
15 I 0.471 0.373 0.624 -0.936 0.017 0.722 0.278 0.261 0.f1826 0.343 0.920
15 10 0.000 2.23 0.000 -0.936 0.009 0.508 0.492 1.29 0.483 1.78 0.789
IS ]00 0.000 20.25 0.000 -0.936 0.009 0.508 0.492 12.9 0.483 13.4 0.662
Note: y`"` - optimal degree of risk sfuring, V`'x~ - society's welfare loss at yLy~ under retional monelary policymaldng. Wx~ ~ society's welfue loss a[ y~y~` uader a mooelary union, 'da.loss' -
determiniatic welfare loss, 'stoch.loss' ~ stochastic welfare loas.No union Moneta unon -















2 0.01 0.996 O.I28 0.997 -0.667 O.lll 0.777 0.223 0.0033 O.I25 0.128 1.00
2 0.1 0.962 O.I58 0.967 -0.667 0.106 0.769 0.231 0.0328 0.125 0.158 0.999
2 1 0.709 0.444 0.770 -0.667 0.080 0.718 0.282 0.301 0.138 0.439 0.9R8
2 10 0.000 2.98 0.222 -0.667 0.032 0.605 0.395 2.62 0.276 2.89 0.971
2 100 0.000 2Z52 0.000 -0.667 0.020 0.569 0.431 25.49 0.375 25.86 0.9~k1
5 0.01 0.993 0.0541 0.994 -0.829 0.072 0.899 O.I01 0.0041 0.0500 0.0541 L00
5 O.l 0.935 0.0906 0.944 -0.829 0.064 0.868 0.132 0.0387 0.0512 0.0900 0.994
5 l 0.613 0.4I1 0.716 -0.829 0.038 0.751 0.249 0.314 0.082 0.396 0.962
5 IO 0.000 2.98 0.290 -0.829 0.012 0.599 0.401 2.60 0.252 2.85
I
0.957
5 l00 0.000 27.52 0.000 -0.829 0.003 0.526 0.474 25.07 0.450 25.52 0.927
11 0.01 0.991 0.0273 0.992 -0.915 0.039 0.948 0.052 0.0045 0.0228 0.0273 1.00
ll 0.1 0.923 0.0670 0.934 -0.915 0.033 0.903 0.097 0.0413 0.0247 0.0660 0.98G
ll I 0.581 0.402 0.702 -0.9I5 0.018 0.759 0.241 0.317 0.0631 0.380 0.947
11 ]0 0.000 2.97 0.308 -0.915 0.005 0.597 0.403 2.39 0.240 2.83 0.952
Il 100 0.000 27.52 0.027 -0.915 0.001 O.SIS 0.482 25.03 0.453 25.49 0.92G
IS 0.01 0.991 0.0213 0.992 -0.937 0.029 0.960 0.040 0.0046 O.O167 0.0213 1.0(1
IS 0.1 0.921 0.0618 0.932 -0.937 0.025 0.911 0.089 0.0419 0.0188 0.0608 0.982
IS 1 0.574 0.400 0.699 -0.937 0.013 0.761 0.239 0.318 0.0590 0.377 0.943
IS ]0 0.000 2.98 0.312 -0.937 0.004 0.547 0.403 2.59 0.238 2.83 0.951
IS 100 0.000 27.52 0.038 -0.937 0.001 O.SIS 0.482 25.03 0.449 25.48
-~
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